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Abstract
We study optimal tax policies in a life-cycle economy with risky human capital
and permanent ability differences, where both ability and learning effort are private
information of the agents. The optimal policies balance several goals: redistribu-
tion across agents, insurance against human capital shocks, incentives to accumulate
human capital, and incentives to work. We show that, in the optimum, i) if util-
ity is separable in labor and learning effort, the inverse marginal labor income tax
rate follows a random walk, ii) the “no distortion at the top” result does not ap-
ply if discouraging labor supply increases incentives to invest in human capital, and
iii) quantitatively, high-ability agents face very risky consumption in order to elicit
learning effort while low-ability agents are insured. We also find large welfare gains
for the U.S. from switching to an optimal tax system.
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1 Introduction
Models of life-cycle economies with agents who have permanent differences in ability
and face shocks to their human capital have been successful in understanding and quan-
tifying the sources of inequality over the life cycle. Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2011)
show that such a model is able to account for key empirical features of the dynamics
of earnings and consumption. We show that this model is also a useful and tractable
framework for studying optimal taxation.
We assume that the government’s choices are limited by two frictions: a standard
Mirrleesean private information friction where ability and labor effort are unobservable
by the government, and a moral hazard friction where human capital investments (learn-
ing effort) and human capital shocks are also unobservable by the government. At the
optimum, the government faces a nontrivial problem of balancing several competing ob-
jectives: redistribution of resources across agents of different abilities; insurance against
human capital shocks; provision of incentives to accumulate human capital; and pro-
vision of incentives to elicit high labor effort from agents with high human capital or
ability.
The interaction of a private information friction and a moral hazard friction produces
several notable theoretical results. When the utility function is additively separable in
labor and learning effort, we show that the inverse of the labor wedge follows a random
walk, implying that the expected labor wedge increases with age (Proposition 5). This
result is, to the best of our knowledge, novel and allows us to identify a new role of age-
dependent taxes: they correct the “undesired” increase in the future labor effort implied
by a positive savings wedge. This may seem surprising, because in a standard dynamic
Mirleesean model, the role of a positive savings wedge is precisely to elicit a higher labor
effort in the future by increasing the present value of future labor income. In our model,
however, the positive savings wedge comes from the moral hazard friction, and its goal
is to elicit a higher learning effort today. Hence, the optimal future labor wedge must
increase to partially correct for this.
We also show that the well-known “no distortion at the top” result from the Mir-
rleesean literature does not apply if the utility function is not additively separable in
labor effort and learning effort (Proposition 4). In our model, even the “top” agent needs
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incentives to increase his or her learning effort. If discouraging labor effort increases in-
centives to invest in human capital, the ‘top” agent will therefore face a positive marginal
tax. Finally, we show that the marginal labor income tax rate is strictly decreasing in
human capital realizations (Proposition 3). People with higher shock realizations are
rewarded by higher consumption, and low labor income tax rates are needed in order to
elicit the right quantity of labor supply.
We calibrate a two period model to match a number of moments of the U.S. econ-
omy (a “status quo” model) and investigate quantitatively the optimal tax policies and
efficient allocations. We find that, at the optimum, only the top one percent of agents
exert higher learning effort than in the status quo. This is achieved mainly by making
their consumption very risky relative to the status quo economy. Specifically, high-ability
agents face very low consumption after very low realizations of human capital shocks,
and this gives them incentives to increase their learning effort. Interestingly, second
period utility is also low for very high realizations of human capital shocks, where the
provision of high labor effort becomes important. This conflicts with the government’s
desire to elicit high learning effort. For middle-ability agents, consumption risk is lower
than for high-ability agents, but still higher than in the status quo economy. Middle-
ability agents with high human capital realizations again provide high effort. This low-
ers their learning effort in the first period below the status quo economy. For low-ability
agents, the desire to provide consumption insurance dominates, and they also choose
a relatively low learning effort. Higher ability agents also face a higher savings wedge,
because their incentives to self-insure are higher. Compared to the status quo, the top
one percent face an increase in their capital income tax rate, while the optimal tax rate
for the bottom 99 percent is lower than their current one.
The private information friction interacts with the moral hazard friction by limit-
ing the amount of consumption risk that high-ability agents face: in its absence, high-
ability agents would face even more consumption risk, and their learning effort would
be higher. Interestingly, our results regarding the distribution of consumption risk stand
in contrast to some of the previous literature with exogenous i.i.d. productivity shocks
(e.g. Albanesi and Sleet, 2006) where high-ability agents typically have more consump-
tion insurance.
We find large welfare gains from implementing the efficient tax system. The unborn
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agent is indifferent between the efficient tax system and the status quo economy with
4.5 percent higher consumption in every period and state of the world. We shut down each
of the two frictions and find that the private information friction is significantly more
costly than the moral hazard friction.
1.1 Relationship to the existing literature
We build on a large literature that looks at models with Ben-Porath’s (1967) technol-
ogy for human capital formation, where investments in education are in terms of time,
rather than in terms of physical resources. Properly parameterized life-cycle versions of
such economies have been studied by Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2006) and Huggett,
Ventura, and Yaron (2011) who are able to quantitatively account for the hump-shaped
profile of average earnings and an increase in the earnings dispersion and skewness over
the life-cycle. Moreover, the stochastic process for earnings generated by the model is
consistent with both leading statistical models, the RIP (restricted income profile) models
(see e.g. MaCurdy 1982, Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron 2004) and the HIP (heteroge-
neous income profile) models (see e.g. Lillard and Weiss 1979, Guvenen 2007).1 Finally,
the Ben-Porath framework is also consistent with the increased dispersion in consump-
tion over the life-cycle, as documented by Aguiar and Hurst (2013) or Primiceri and van
Rens (2009). Our paper takes the economy with risky human capital and permanent
ability differences as a starting point for the optimal taxation analysis.
On the normative side, our paper contributes to the growing literature that studies
optimal taxation with endogenous human capital formation. The paper uses the Mirrlees
approach (Mirrlees 1971, 1976) to optimal taxation. Recent dynamic extensions of the
Mirrlees approach, including Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2003), Kocherlakota
(2005), Farhi and Werning (2007), Albanesi and Sleet (2006), Werning (2007), Battaglini
and Coate (2008), Farhi and Werning (2013) and Golosov, Tsyvinski, and Troshkin (2015),
have mostly focused on cases when individual skills are exogenous. In contrast, this
paper focuses on a case when individual skills are endogenous.
Our paper is the first one that studies an environment of optimal taxation with hu-
1The difference between RIP and HIP models is that in HIP models people face heterogeneous life-cycle
earning profiles, while in RIP models individuals face similar life-cycle earning profiles.
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man capital where both private information and moral hazard frictions are present.2
In this respect, our paper is close to Shourideh (2014), who studies an economy with
unobservable risky physical, rather than human, capital investments and unobservable
abilities and also considers the interplay between moral hazard and private information
frictions. An important difference between hidden savings and hidden human capital
investments is that hidden savings imply hidden consumption. Hidden consumption, in
turn, implies that incentive compatibility constraints might be upward binding, poten-
tially changing the nature of the redistributive problem.
We assume that human capital investments are risky and unobservable.3 In contrast,
da Costa and Maestri (2007), Jacobs, Schindler, and Yang (2012) and Stantcheva (2015a)
all study optimal taxation with risky Ben-Porath technology, but allow human capital
investments to be observable. This not only shuts down the moral hazard dimension
of the problem, but also permits the government to use direct human capital subsidies
conditional on learning effort. We think that unobservability of learning effort is a rea-
sonable assumption to make. Even if the government could observe the number of hours
that each individual spends by accumulating human capital in a formal setting, it is not
obvious that this would be a good approximation of one’s learning effort.
In term of human capital technology, our approach is complementary to Bovenberg
and Jacobs (2005), Grochulski and Piskorski (2010), Findeisen and Sachs (2015a, 2015b)
and Stantcheva (2015b), who all assume that human capital investments are in terms
of goods (under various assumptions about observability of human capital investments)
and thus study a different aspect of human capital formation. Our paper is also related to
a recent research that quantitatively studies optimal tax reforms in environments with
endogenous human capital such as Gorry and Oberfield (2012), Krueger and Ludwig
(2013) and Peterman (2014). This literature is able to consider richer frameworks than
ours by restricting taxes to specific functional forms.
2Abraham, Koehne, and Pavoni (2014) and Albanesi (2007) study the impact of moral hazard on optimal
tax structures. Unlike our paper, they do not consider the interaction between moral hazard and private
information.
3Environments with riskless human capital have been previously studied by Diamond and Mirrlees
(2002), Kapicˇka (2006), Bohácˇek and Kapicˇka (2008) and Kapicˇka (2015) and others.
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2 The Model
Consider the following life-cycle economy. Agents live for two periods. They like to
consume, dislike working and exerting learning effort, and have preferences given by
U(c1)−V(`1, e1) + βE [U(c2)−V(`2, e2)] , (1)
where j ∈ {1, 2} is age, cj ≥ 0 is consumption, `j ≥ 0 is labor effort, and ej ≥ 0 is learning
effort. The function U is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and differentiable. The
function V is strictly increasing, strictly convex, and differentiable in both arguments.
We further restrict the function V by assuming that, conditionally on the learning effort
being zero, the function V exhibits a constant Frisch elasticity of labor γ(`, e) = V`(`,e)
`V``(`,e)
:
Assumption 1. The elasticity of labor effort γ(`, 0) is independent of `.
An agent’s earnings yj are determined by the agent’s ability a, current human capital
hj, and current labor effort `j:
yj = ahj`j. (2)
Ability is constant over an agent’s lifetime and is known to the agents at the beginning
of the first period. The ability has continuous support A = (a, a), with a possibly being
infinite. All agents are born with the same initial human capital h1. Human capital in
the second period h2 has continuous support H = (h, h), with h possibly infinite, and
depends on an idiosyncratic human capital depreciation shock z2, initial human capital
h1, and on learning effort e1:
h2 = exp(z2)F(h1, e1). (3)
The function F is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and differentiable in both argu-
ments. As is standard in the moral hazard literature, we transform the state-space repre-
sentation of the problem to work directly with the distribution induced over h2. To that
end, we construct a probability density function of human capital in the second period
conditional on first period effort and denote it p(h2|e1). The derivative of the density
with respect to effort pe(h|e) exists, and we assume that the conditional distribution of
the second period human capital satisfies the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property:
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Assumption 2 (MLRP). pe(h|e)p(h|e) is strictly increasing in h for all e.
The MLRP property has the usual interpretation that higher effort induces a more
favorable distribution of human capital outcomes.
This economy is identical to Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2011), with two exceptions.
First, this model includes leisure. That is essential for thinking about optimal taxation.
Second, the ability a affects earnings directly, rather than indirectly through the human
capital production function. That is irrelevant in the incomplete markets economy stud-
ied by Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2011) if the human capital production function
takes the Ben-Porath form.4 However, both formulations have different implications in
a Mirrleesean economy with private information and observable human capital where
it makes a difference whether h or ha is observed.5 The formulation chosen in this pa-
per has the advantage that it is entirely consistent with the existing Mirrleesean optimal
taxation literature.
Our preferred interpretation of observable risky human capital is the observability of
a person’s industry, firm, or occupation. Human capital shocks then take the interpreta-
tion of shocks to industries, firms, or occupations. Support for this view comes from the
literature which argues that human capital is occupation, firm, or industry-specific (see
Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993, Neal 1995, Parent 2000, Poletaev and Robinson
2008, and Kambourov and Manovskii 2009).
3 Efficient Allocations
The information structure is as follows: ability a, labor effort `1 and `2, learning effort e1
and e2, and human capital shock z2 are private information of the agent. Consumption
c1 and c2, earnings y1 and y2, and human capital h1 and h2, are publicly observable.
Agents report their ability level to the social planner in the first period. An agent’s true
ability is denoted by a whereas aˆ denotes the ability report.
4To see that both formulations are isomorphic, let F(h, e) = h + (eh)α. Redefine human capital as
follows: Let h¯ = ha and a¯ = a1−α. Then the law of motion for human capital is F¯(h, e) = h¯ + a¯(eh¯)α, and
the earnings are y = h¯`, identical to the ones in Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2011).
5Both formulations are isomorphic if both h and a are either observable or unobservable. The first case
is inconsistent with the Mirrleesean framework, while the second one would be extremely hard to solve
in general.
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An allocation (c, y) consists of consumption c = {c1(aˆ), c2(aˆ, h2)} and earnings y =
{y1(aˆ), y2(aˆ, h2)}. Consumption and earnings in the first period are conditional on ability
report aˆ ∈ A. In the second period they are both conditional on the ability report in the
first period and realization of human capital in the second period, h2 ∈ H. Define the
lifetime utility of an a-type agent who reports ability aˆ and exerts effort e as W(aˆ, e|a),
where
W(aˆ, e|a) ≡ U(c1(aˆ))−V
(
y1(aˆ)
ah1
, e
)
+ β
∫
H
[
U (c2(aˆ, h2))−V
(
y2(aˆ, h2)
ah2
, 0
)]
p(h2|e)dh2.
Effort in the second period is trivially equal to zero. The first period effort e˜1(aˆ|a)
maximizes the lifetime utility of an a−type agent who reports aˆ:
e˜1(aˆ|a) ≡ arg max
e≥0
W(aˆ, e|a). (4)
By the revelation principle, we restrict attention to the allocations that are incentive
compatible, i.e. where the agent prefers to tell the truth about his or her ability:
W(a, e˜1(a|a)|a) ≥W(aˆ, e˜1(aˆ|a)|a) ∀a, aˆ ∈ A. (5)
In order to reduce notational complexity we define the utility maximizing effort plan
conditional on truthtelling by e1(a) ≡ e˜1(a|a), and let W(a) = W(a, e(a)|a) be the corre-
sponding truthteller’s lifetime utility.
An allocation is feasible if it satisfies the resource constraint
∫
A
[
c1(a)− y1(a) + R−1
∫
H
[c2(a, h2)− y2(a, h2)] p(h2|e1(a)) dh2
]
q(a) da ≤ 0, (6)
where q(a) is the probability distribution of abilities and R is the gross interest rate. For
simplicity, we assume that R = β−1.
The social welfare function is simply the expected utility of an agent who does not
yet know his or her ability:
W =
∫
A
W(a)q(a) da. (7)
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Definition 1. An allocation is constrained efficient if it maximizes welfare (7) subject to the
resource constraint (6) and the incentive compatibility constraint (5), where the learning effort is
given by (4).
First-Order Approach. The first-order approach replaces the constraints (4) and (5)
with two conditions. The first one is the first-order condition in effort and says that,
at the optimum, the marginal costs of learning effort must be equal to the expected
marginal benefit of learning effort (given by the additional utility arising from the fact
that the distribution of future human capital shocks is now more favorable):
Ve
(
y1(a)
ah1
, e1(a)
)
= β
∫
H
[
U(c2(a, h2))−V
(
y2(a, h2)
ah2
, 0
)]
pe(h2|e1(a)) dh2. (8)
The second condition is an envelope condition governing how the lifetime utility needs
to vary with ability in order to deter the agent from misreporting his type. Let W(a)
denote the lifetime utility of the least able agent. The envelope condition is
W(a) = W(a)+
∫ a
a
{
V`
(
y1(a˜)
a˜h1
, e1(a˜)
)
y1(a˜)
a˜h1
+ β
∫
H
V`
(
y2(a˜, h2)
a˜h2
, 0
)
y2(a˜, h2)
a˜h2
p(h2|e1(a˜)) dh2
}
da˜
a˜
. (9)
The envelope condition states that the variation in lifetime utility for an agent a is the
lifetime utility of the least able agent plus the informational rent the agent obtains from
having his or her given ability level. Replacing the incentive constraint with the first
order condition in effort and the envelope condition leads to a relaxed planning problem:
Definition 2. An allocation solves the relaxed planning problem if it maximizes welfare (7)
subject to the resource constraint (6), the first-order condition in effort (8) and the envelope
condition (9) .
For now, we assume that the first-order approach is valid and the set of constrained
efficient allocations are identical to the set of allocations that satisfy the relaxed planning
problem. We examine its validity at the end of Section 3.1.
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3.1 Theoretical Implications
We will now characterize the properties of the efficient allocation and of the labor and
savings wedges. Let λ, φ(a)q(a) and θ(a)q(a) be the Lagrange multipliers on the resource
constraint (6), the first order condition (8) and on the envelope condition (9).6 The first-
order conditions in consumption are
1
U′(c1(a))
=
1+ θ(a)
λ
(10a)
1
U′(c2(a, h2))
=
1+ θ(a) + φ(a) pe(h2|e1(a))p(h2|e1(a))
λ
. (10b)
The following proposition shows that if the elasticity of labor effort is constant in the
second period and the monotone likelihood property hold, the Lagrange multiplier on
the first-order condition in effort is positive and second period consumption is increasing
in human capital realizations:
Proposition 1. If Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then φ(a) is strictly positive and c2(a, h2) is
strictly increasing in h2.
Proof. Consider a doubly relaxed problem where the first order condition in effort (8) is not
imposed. Then φ(a) = 0, which implies that c2(a, h2) is independent of h2 by (10b). The first-
order condition in `2(a, h2) is
λah2
V` (`2(a, h2))
= 1+ θ(a) +Θ(a)
(
1
γ (`2(a, h2), 0)
+ 1
)
, (11)
where Θ(a) ≥ 0 is the cumulative multiplier on the envelope condition (9). By Assumption 1,
γ(`, 0) is independent of `. Equation (11) then implies that `2(a, h2) is strictly increasing in h2. By
Assumption 2, the right-hand side of (8) must then be strictly negative. Since the left-hand side
of (8) is nonnegative, it is sufficient to require the right-hand side of (8) to be weakly greater than
the left-hand side in order for (8) to hold as equality. The Kuhn-Tucker theorem then implies
φ(a) > 0. Strict monotonicity of c then follows from Assumption 2 and equation (10b).
A strictly positive Lagrange multiplier φ implies that the social planner would, in
the absence of the effort constraint (8), increase private marginal costs of effort above
6See Appendix A for the full Langrangean solution method.
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the private marginal benefits of effort. In fact, as the proof shows, the marginal ben-
efits of higher effort would be negative: agents with higher human capital would see
no consumption increase, but would work more. In the absence of a moral hazard fric-
tion, such an allocation could be supported by positive human capital subsidies (as in
Jacobs, Schindler, and Yang 2012 and gross subsidy in Stantcheva 2015a). The moral
hazard friction prevents that, and the social planner responds by making second period
consumption increasing in human capital.
Taking the expectation of (10b) (and noting that
∫
H pe (h2|e1(a)) dh2 = 0) implies
immediately that, conditional on the ability type, the Inverse Euler equation holds:
1
U′(c1(a))
=
∫
H
1
U′(c2(a, h2))
p (h2|e1(a)) dh2 ∀a ∈ A. (12)
The Inverse Euler Equation would hold in the absence of the moral hazard friction as
well. In that case, however, the second period consumption would be deterministic,
conditional on ability.
Savings wedge. Define the savings wedge δ as the gap between the current marginal
utility of consumption and the expected future marginal utility of consumption:
U′(c1(a)) =
(
1− δ(a)) ∫
H
U′(c2(a, h2))p (h2|e1(a)) dh2.
By Jensen’s inequality, the Inverse Euler Equation (12) immediately implies the follow-
ing:
Proposition 2. The savings wedge δ(a) is strictly positive for each ability level a.
Note, however, that a strictly positive savings wedge comes purely from the moral
hazard friction on the model, and not from the private information friction. As we shall
see later, this fact will have important consequences for the optimal structure of labor
wedges.
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Labor wedge. Similarly, define the labor wedge τ`j as the gap between the marginal
product of labor and the intratemporal marginal rate of substitution at each age:
ah1
(
1− τ`1 (a)
)
=
V`
(
`1(a), e1(a)
)
U′(c1(a))
,
ah2
(
1− τ`2 (a, h2)
)
=
V`
(
`2(a, h2), e2(a, h2)
)
U′(c2(a, h2))
.
In the optimum, the labor wedges τ`1 and τ
`
2 satisfy
1
U′(c1(a))
τ`1 (a)
1− τ`1 (a)
=
(
1+
1
γ(`1(a), e1(a))
)
Θ(a) +
φ(a)
λ
V`e (`1(a), e1(a))
V` (`1(a), e1(a))
(14a)
1
U′(c2(a, h2))
τ`2 (a, h2)
1− τ`2 (a, h2)
=
(
1+
1
γ(`2(a, h2), 0)
)
Θ(a), (14b)
where Θ(a) = (aq(a))−1
∫ a
a θ(a˜)q(a˜) da˜ is the cumulative Lagrange multiplier on the
envelope condition. In the following two propositions, we characterize the labor wedge.
The proofs are omitted, since the results follow directly from the optimality conditions
(14a) and (14b), and from Proposition 1.
Proposition 3. If Assumptions 1 and 2 hold then τ`2 (a, h2) is strictly decreasing in h2.
The second period labor wedge is decreasing in the human capital shock because
people with higher shock realizations are assigned higher consumption (Proposition 1),
but for efficiency reasons they must be given enough incentives to supply labor. It is
easy to see that if the support is unbounded and U satisfies the second Inada condition
then the second period tax wedge converges to zero as h2 converges to infinity. Those
conditions will be satisfied, for example, if the distribution of h2 is lognormal and the
utility function U is of the CRRA form. To characterize the limits of the labor wedge
in the ability dimension, we assume that Θ(a) converges to zero when a approaches its
upper bound a. This assumption is made in order to avoid obvious and well known
cases when the top marginal tax rates do not converge to zero, and is satisfied whenever
the ability distribution is bounded.
Proposition 4. Suppose that Θ(a) converges to zero as a converges to a. Then τ`1 (a) converges
to a positive (negative) value if V`e is positive (negative). In addition, τ`2 (a, h2) converges to zero
for all h2 ∈ H.
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Thus, the “no distortion at the top” result from Mirrlees (1971) does not apply when-
ever the utility is not additively separable in labor and effort. Nonseparability allows
the planner to change incentives to exert learning effort by changing first period labor
effort. If V`e > 0, discouraging labor effort in the first period increases incentives to exert
learning effort, and it is optimal to do so, even for the “top” agent. This result differs
from Kapicˇka (2015) where human capital is unobservable but riskless. The absence of
risk means that there is no scope for insurance against human capital risk. If the “top”
agent faces a zero marginal tax, she will choose the efficient amount of learning effort,
because she bears all the costs and benefits of the investment (the Lagrange multiplier φ
is zero for the top agent, rather than being strictly positive). As a result, it is optimal to
have a zero marginal tax on the “top” agent. Note also that this channel is absent in the
second period where the “no distortion at the top” result applies.
Grochulski and Piskorski (2010) obtain a similar result, but their argument behind
the nonzero tax at the top is different. In their model, the high-ability agents always
face a negative marginal tax rate, because that helps to separate the truthtellers from
deviators: deviators underinvest in human capital, have lower productivity, and are hurt
by the negative marginal tax at the top more than truthtellers. This mechanism does not
appear in our model because human capital realizations are observable. On the other
hand, our mechanism is absent in Grochulski and Piskorski (2010), who do not allow for
simultaneous labor effort and investment in human capital. 7
If labor effort and learning effort are additively separable and labor effort has a con-
stant elasticity then the inverse of the labor wedge follows a random walk:
Proposition 5. If γ(`, e) is a constant and V`e = 0 then
1
τ`1 (a)
=
∫
H
1
τ`2 (a, h2)
p(h2|e1(a)) dh2.
Proof. Since the right-hand sides of (14a) and (14b) are equal when V`e = 0,
τ`1 (a)
1− τ`1 (a)
1− τ`2 (a, h2)
τ`2 (a, h2)
=
U′(c1(a))
U′(c2(a, h2))
.
7There are additional arguments for violation of the no distortion on the top result in the literature:
Stiglitz (1982) obtains a negative tax on the top when skilled and unskilled labor are imperfect substitutes.
Slavík and Yazici (2014) establish the same result when there is capital-skill complementarity. Those
arguments rely on general equilibrium effects that are absent in our paper.
13
The result follows from using (12) and rearranging.
The result is due to several facts. First, a marginal tax revenue is proportional to
τ`j /(1− τ`j ) for j = 1, 2 (see e.g. Saez 2001). Second, since the ability shock is perma-
nent, the social planner wants to keep the tax revenue valued at its marginal utility cost
1/U′(cj) constant over time and state. Since 1/U′(cj) follows a random walk, (1− τ`j )/τ`j
must follow a random walk as well. Jensen’s inequality then implies that the average
labor wedge is increasing over time:
Corollary 1.
τ`1 (a) <
∫
H
τ`2 (a, h2)p (h2|e1(a)) dh2. (15)
To understand the intuition for the result, consider an individual who faces no risk,
can borrow and save, his labor is taxed at rate τ`j , and his savings are taxed at a rate τ
k.8
The present value of the agent’s earnings can be written as
w1`1(1− τ`1 ) +
w2`2
1+ r
(1+ r)(1− τ`2 )
1+ r(1− τk) .
The savings tax affects the relative marginal labor tax in both periods by increasing the
present value of future wages. A tax on savings thus decreases the effective tax rate on
second period labor given by τˆ`2 = 1− (1+r)(1−τ
`
2 )
1+r(1−τk) . By Corollary 1, the optimal tax on
labor compensates for the implicit subsidy. Note that the tax on savings does not come
from a dynamic private information friction, as in Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski
(2003), Farhi and Werning (2013) and other dynamic Mirrleesean literature. In such
case, there would be no need to compensate the savings tax by a higher future labor
tax, because the point of the savings tax is precisely to elicit a higher future working
effort (equivalently, relax future incentive constraints). In our model, the savings tax
comes from the moral hazard part of the problem, and its purpose is to elicit higher
learning effort today, and not higher labor supply tomorrow. In the absence of the moral
hazard friction, the savings wedge is zero and it is optimal to have perfect tax smoothing,
τ`1 = τ
`
2 . In its presence, it is optimal to “undo” the savings tax, at least partially, by a
higher future labor tax.
8In Section B we show how to implement the savings wedge as a one-to-one mapping to a regular tax
on savings, τk.
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Additively separable utility in labor effort and learning effort serves as a useful
benchmark. If labor and effort are complements, the Frisch elasticity γ(`j, ej) changes
endogenously and the expected labor wedge may no longer be increasing. Estimates
from Peterman (2014) suggest that the elasticity decreases over time in this scenario: it
is higher when agents spend more time exerting effort, which happens at younger ages.
This reinforces the increasing intertemporal profile of the labor wedge. On the other
hand, V`e > 0 increases the labor wedge in the first period. Since V`e is zero in the
second period (because of zero effort), this weakens, or reverts, the increasing profile of
the labor wedge.
Special Cases. It is instructive to explore the effect of each of the frictions on the wedges
by shutting down the moral hazard and the private information individually. We do this
by setting the Lagrange multipliers φ(a) = 0 and θ(a) = 0, respectively. If there is no
moral hazard, the planner can then dictate learning effort directly. Thus, consumption
no longer needs to vary with human capital realizations and is deterministic. Equation
(12) implies that the savings wedge is zero. From Proposition 5, there is perfect tax
smoothing across time and the labor wedge varies only with ability, as in a static Mirrlees
model. With no private information, the planner can dictate labor effort directly. As a
consequence, there is no need for the planner to induce labor effort through the labor
wedge and τ`1 = τ
`
2 = 0. The savings wedge remains positive, as the moral hazard
requires consumption uncertainty to induce optimal learning effort.
Implementation. We show in Appendix B that the efficient allocation can be imple-
mented by a tax system consisting of income tax functions T1(y1), T2(y1, y2, h2) and a
savings tax τk(s, y), where s are first period savings. While the first period income tax
depends only on the current income, the second period income tax depends on the
second period human capital realization, and can potentially depend on the history of
incomes. In the optimum, the effective marginal income tax rate is equated to the labor
wedge, and the marginal savings tax rate is equated to the savings wedge.
Validity of the First-Order Approach. The first-order approach might fail either be-
cause the first-order condition (8) fails to detect a utility-maximizing learning effort
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choice, or because the envelope condition (9) fails to detect the utility-maximizing re-
port. In Appendix C, we show conditions that ensure that those two conditions are
sufficient. Conditions for the sufficiency of (8) are similar to Jewitt (1988) (Theorem
1). The main difference is that it must be assumed that the second period utility is
nondecreasing and concave in h2. It cannot be inferred from the primitives because if
labor effort is increasing in h2 sufficiently fast, the second period utility may decrease
in h2. Conditions for sufficiency of (9) are relatively standard. Overall, the conditions
for sufficiency are quite strict. In our quantitative exercise, they are not satisfied, but the
allocation is still incentive compatible.
4 Quantitative Analysis
The benchmark model is the decentralized incomplete markets economy with observed
U.S. capital and labor income tax rates, which we refer to as the “status quo”. The status
quo model is used to calibrate the initial human capital level and the parameters of the
ability distribution. We then calculate the constrained efficient outcomes by replacing
the status quo tax system for an efficient tax system, while keeping all other parameters
of the status quo model unchanged.
4.1 Calibration
Parameters are set in two steps. First, standard parameters and those for which there
are available estimates are set before solving the model. The remaining parameters are
set to match moments from the data. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the calibration.
A model period is twenty years. The first period represents agents between 20 and
40 years of age, and the second period represents agents between 40 and 60 years of age.
Preferences. The instantaneous utility function for consumption is CRRA,
U(c) =
c1−ρ
1− ρ .
The value of the parameter controlling intertemporal substitution and risk-aversion is set
to ρ = 1, within the range of estimates surveyed by Browning, Hansen, and Heckman
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Table 1: Parameters Set Exogenously
Definition Symbol Value Source/Target
CRRA parameter ρ 1 Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999)
Frisch elasticity of labor γ 0.5 Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber (2011)
Elasticity of effort e 0.5 Same as Frisch elasticity
Discount factor β 0.442 0.96 annual
Interest rate r 119% 4% annual
H.C. technology α 0.7 Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999)
Capital income tax rate τ¯k 45.88% 37% effective annual; McDaniel (2007)
Labor tax function (ν0, ν1, ν2) (0.182, 0.008, 1.496) Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2014)
Shock distribution (µz, σz) (-0.58, 0.496) Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2011)
Table 2: Calibrated Parameters
Definition Symbol Value Target Moment Model U.S. Data Source
Initial human capital h1 0.680 y¯1/y¯2 0.868 0.868 HVY (2011)
St. dev. log-ability σa 0.585 Earnings Gini 0.341 0.343 HVY (2011)
Mean log-ability µa 0.170 Earnings Var. 0.390 0.390 HVY (2011)
(1999). Preferences are additively separable in labor and effort with constant elasticities:
V(`, e) =
`1+1/γ
1+ 1/γ
+
e1+1/e
1+ 1/e
.
The Frisch elasticity of labor supply is set to γ = 0.5, consistent with micro estimates
surveyed in Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber (2011). The elasticity of learning effort
is set to e = 0.5, equal to the Frisch elasticity. Agents’ discount factor is set to β =
(0.96)20 = 0.442. Recall that we set R = β−1.
Technology. The human capital production function is of the Ben-Porath form. Human
capital in the second period h2, depends on idiosyncratic human capital shock z2, initial
human capital h1, and first period learning effort e1:
F(h1, e1) = h1 + (e1h1)α.
The value of the human capital concavity parameter α = 0.7 is the same used in Huggett,
Ventura, and Yaron (2011), and is in the middle of the range of estimates surveyed by
Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999).
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The shock process is assumed to be i.i.d. and the shocks are drawn from a truncated
normal distribution, z ∼ N(µz, σz). The human capital shock process is estimated in
Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2011). The Ben-Porath functional form implies that to-
wards the end of the lifetime agents accumulate little human capital and the changes
in human capital are mostly due to shocks. Thus, the parameters of the shock process
can be approximated by assuming older workers in the data exert zero learning effort.9
Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2011) estimate σaz = 0.111 and µaz = −0.029 annually. We
transform the shock process to its 20-year period equivalent, σz =
√
20(σaz )2 = 0.496 and
µz = 20µaz = −0.58. These estimates imply that, in 20 years, a one-standard deviation
shock moves wages by about 49.6 percent and human capital depreciates on average by
36.7 percent.
Status Quo Tax System. We approximate the U.S. tax system with a flat tax on capital
income and a progressive tax on labor income. Tax revenues are redistributed lump-sum
in the first period. The budget constraint for a given agent takes the form
c1 + k2 =
(
1+ r(1− τ¯k))k1 + ah1`1 − T(ah1`1) + LS1
c2 =
(
1+ r(1− τ¯k))k2 + ah2`2 − T(ah2`2),
where LS1 is the lump-sum transfer in the first period. Without loss of generality, we set
the lump-sum transfer in the second period to zero. Labor taxes take the Gouveia-Strauss
form
T(y) = ν0[1− (ν1yν2 + 1)−1/ν2 ].
Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2014) estimate that the values of the Gouveia-Strauss
function for individuals with no capital income are ν0 = 0.182, ν1 = 0.008, and ν2 =
1.496. These parameters imply progressive marginal tax rates starting at 8 percent and
increasing to 24.5 percent. We obtain mean average tax rates for capital and consumption
9Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2011) calculate wages from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
for males between 55 and 65 years of age. Wages are total male labor earnings divided by total hours for
the male head of household, using the Consumer Price Index to convert nominal wages to real wages.
Then they estimate the parameters of the shock process from a log-wage difference regression. In our
model, wages are unobservable but differences in log-wages are observable since abilities are permanent
and are factored out.
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from McDaniel (2007).10 We adjust labor and capital tax rates by the average consump-
tion tax. This yields an effective annual capital tax rate of τ¯ka = 37%, which we transform
to a 20-year value.11 The effective 20-year tax rate on capital income is τ¯k = 45.88%.
Initial Conditions. Following Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2006) and Huggett, Ven-
tura, and Yaron (2011), we posit that the ability distribution is log-normally distributed,
q(a) = LN(µa, σ2a ). The initial human capital, h1, is the same for all agents. We set µa,
σ2a , and h1 so that the equilibrium distribution of earnings matches data earnings mo-
ments. Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2011) estimate age profiles of mean earnings from
the PSID 1969-2004 family files. We target three moments: The ratio of mean earnings of
younger workers (ages 23 to 40) to mean earnings of older workers (ages 40 to 60), the
earnings Gini coefficient, and the variance of earnings. Table 2 reports the results of the
calibration. Parameters values h1 = 0.680, σ2a = 0.585, and µa = 0.170 best approximate
the model to the data targets.
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Figure 1: Consumption Risk and Effort
10We use tax rates for the 1969-2004 period for compatibility with the PSID sample used to calculate the
human capital shocks.
11The effective 20-year capital income tax rate is the solution to (1+ ra(1− τ¯ka ))20 = 1+ r(1− τ¯k).
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4.2 Findings
Insurance, Redistribution and Incentives. Proposition 1 shows that a risky second
period consumption is necessary to provide optimal incentives to accumulate human
capital. Figure 1a shows that the standard deviation of log-consumption in the second
period increases dramatically with ability. Relative to the status quo economy, the effi-
cient tax system yields lower consumption risk for low-ability and medium-ability agents
but significantly higher consumption risk for high-ability agents (about 99th percentile).
Figure 1b shows the corresponding effort elicited from the agents in both the efficient
and in the status quo allocation. For agents above the 99th percentile the efficient allo-
cation elicits higher learning effort. However, for agents below the 99th percentile the
efficient effort is lower than in the status quo economy. In particular, the agents between
the 77th percentile and the 99th percentile experience both an increase in the variability
of consumption and a decrease in effort. Higher dispersion of consumption does not
seem to motivate them to increase effort.
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Figure 2: Second Period Utility Profiles. Darker shades represent higher probabilities.
To understand this surprising result, one needs to realize that, for each type, the
efficient distribution of second period consumption and utilities reflects the conflicting
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objectives of providing incentives to accumulate human capital, providing consumption
insurance, and eliciting efficient labor effort in the second period. Figure 2 shows the
distribution of second period utilities for three ability levels (darker segments of the
lines represent higher probability realizations). Second period utilities are, in general,
hump-shaped in the human capital shock: the agents face a downside risk both at the
left-tail and in the right-tail of the distribution. Consider the picture in the middle,
which shows second period utilities for an agent with higher dispersion of consumption
and lower effort (between 77th and 99th percentile). For the lowest realizations of h2
the efficient allocation provides a very low second period utility, significantly lower than
the status quo allocation. This increases the incentives to accumulate human capital and
is also responsible for the high standard deviation of second period log-consumption.
For the highest realizations of h2 the efficient allocation is decreasing in the shock. It is
efficient to have the agents exert high labor effort in the second period, and consumption
insurance limits the rewards for doing so. Finally, for the likeliest realizations of h2 in the
middle range, the desire to insure against those shocks dominates other considerations,
and the second period utility is relatively flat. Both the efficiency consideration at the
top and insurance consideration in the middle of the distribution decrease the learning
effort, which is then mainly elicited by the first effect, essentially a threat of very low
consumption in the unlikely case of a low shock realization.12 For the agent in the
middle picture, the last two effects dominate and their learning effort is lower than in
the status quo economy. For agents at the bottom of the ability distribution (pitured in
the left picture) the insurance objective clearly dominates, their second period utility is
almost flat, and their learning effort is very low. At the top of the ability distribution
(pictured on the right), on the other hand, the motivations to provide higher learning
effort and higher labor effort for high shocks outweigh the insurance motive.
Figure 2 also shows that low-ability agents enjoy higher utility in the second period,
while high-ability agents face the largest decrease in the second period utility. Relative
to the status quo, the consumption distribution thus becomes more equal within each
period. Low-ability agents enjoy, in expectation, higher consumption than in the status
12A consequence of concave utility is that utility is more responsive at lower levels of consumption,
so it is less costly for the planner to incentivize learning effort by punishing low realizations than by
rewarding good realizations. Relative to the status quo, the efficient second period consumption function
is significantly more concave.
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Figure 3: Labor, by ability percentiles.
quo economy, and resources are redistributed away from high-ability agents. Labor
effort, shown in Figure 3, moves in the opposite direction. Relative to the status quo,
the labor earnings distribution (expected labor earnings in the second period) becomes
more unequal, as it is optimal to concentrate labor earnings at the top of the distribution.
Overall, the moral hazard friction increases consumption dispersion in the second pe-
riod, while the private information friction tends to equalize consumption across agents.
On the other hand, both the moral hazard and private information friction tend to in-
crease labor effort dispersion. Numerical simulations also show that the private informa-
tion friction tends to limit the amount of risk faced by high-ability agents. In its absence,
the hump-shaped profiles in Figure 2 are significantly more pronounced: higher ability
agents face more left-tail downside risk, but they also face more right-tail downside risk
of having lower utility after receiving high shocks.
Savings wedge. Figure 4 illustrates that the savings wedge is strictly increasing in
ability. Since high-ability agents face the riskiest second period consumption, they have
the highest incentive to self-insure through savings. In order to discourage that, the
social planner imposes a higher savings tax on them. This result stands in contrast
to the previous literature that features exogenous i.i.d. shocks (e.g. Albanesi and Sleet
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2006), where high-ability agents typically face less consumption risk, and a lower savings
wedge than low-ability agents.
For the highest ability agents, the savings wedge is 34 percent. This translates into an
efficient tax on annual capital income τka of 49.3 percent.13 Thus, for the highest ability
agents the efficient tax on capital income is about 12.3 percent higher than the current
U.S. tax rate. However, for the 99th percentile the savings wedge is 27.3 percent, which
translates into an efficient tax on annual capital income τka of 37 percent, almost exactly
identical to the current U.S. tax rate. Thus, while the top one percent would optimally
face an increase in the capital income tax rate, the optimal tax rate for the bottom 99
percent is lower than the current one. An individual with median abilities would, for
example, face a capital income tax rate of only 5.3 percent.
Labor wedge. The labor wedge in the first period and the expected labor wedge in
the second period are shown in Figure 5a. Several features stand out. First, since high-
ability agents are faced with the highest savings tax, they also need the highest increase
in the labor wedge. Hence the difference between the first period labor wedge and
13We use the relationship 1− δ = β(1 + r(1− τk)) to recover the tax on capital earnings over 20 years
τk, and then convert it to an annual value τka .
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the second period expected labor wedge is highest for high-ability agents (but small, at
about 2 percent increase). Second, the labor wedge in the first period decreases with
abilities and converges to zero. This is due to the assumption of lognormally distributed
abilities, as in the static Mirrlees case, and the fact that the utility function is additively
separable in labor supply and effort. The second period labor wedge is shown in Figure
5b. The labor wedge is very high for low human capital realizations and then decreases
with human capital, as predicted in Proposition 3. The decrease is most rapid for higher
ability levels, reflecting the fact that higher ability agents face a more risky consumption
profile.
Welfare. We now compute the welfare gains relative to the status quo. The overall
welfare gain is defined as the percentage increase in period consumption that would
make an agent who does not yet know her type indifferent between the status quo
allocation and the constrained efficient allocation, keeping labor and effort unchanged.
Specifically, the welfare gain is the η that solves,
W
(
(1+ η)cSQ1 , (1+ η)c
SQ
2 , `
SQ
1 , `
SQ
2 , e
SQ
1
)
= WCE.
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where the SQ denote status quo allocations and CE denotes constrained efficient alloca-
tions. We find that the welfare gains of switching to an optimal tax system are equivalent
to a η = 4.5% increase in consumption in every period and state of the world.
Table 3: Welfare Gains
Welfare Gains
Status Quo 0%
Constrained Efficient 4.5%
No moral hazard 6.4%
No private information 26.8%
No frictions 32.7%
We report the welfare gains in Table 3. Shutting down the moral hazard friction
completely (by setting the Lagrange multiplier φ(a) = 0) yields welfare gains of 6.4
percent over the status quo. Shutting down the private information friction completely
(by setting the Lagrange multiplier θ(a) = 0) yields a much larger gain in welfare of 26.8
percent. Shutting down both constraints completely yields a first-best welfare gain of
32.7 percent.
The distribution of welfare changes across types is illustrated in Figure 6. The large
welfare gains accrue at the bottom of the ability distribution. In contrast, the top abilities
lose a substantial amount of welfare compared to the status quo economy. However,
it is worth noting that welfare is still increasing with ability in the constrained efficient
economy in order to prevent agents from misreporting their ability level (as expressed
by the envelope condition (9)).
Verifying the validity of the First Order Approach. Since second period utility is not
monotonically increasing in human capital realizations, as shown in Figure 2, the suffi-
cient conditions in Proposition 7 are not satisfied. We therefore verified directly that the
expected lifetime utility is concave in the effort. Figure 7 shows that this is indeed the
case, and that the first order approach is valid.
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5 Conclusion
This paper addresses two questions: What is the optimal tax structure when there is
endogenous human capital accumulation? What are the welfare gains for the U.S. from
switching to an optimal tax system? We answer these normative questions in a hu-
man capital framework that has been successful at positive analysis. The prominent
features of the framework are permanent ability differences, Ben-Porath human capital
accumulation technology, and risky returns to investments in human capital. The model
is sufficiently rich to be useful for policy analysis, and we show that it is also tractable
enough for the normative analysis.
The interaction of private information and moral hazard frictions is novel in the
optimal taxation with human capital literature, and produces several prominent results.
First, the labor wedge has a sharp characterization. When utility is separable in labor and
learning efforts, the average intratemporal wedge is increasing over an agent’s lifetime
in order to correct for undesired distortions from a positive savings wedge. Second,
the “no distortion at the top” result from Mirrlees (1971) might not apply when taxing
labor encourages human capital accumulation. Quantitatively, we find that it is efficient
to design the tax system so that higher ability people face higher consumption risk
in order to provide them with incentives to accumulate human capital. Consequently,
higher ability people have the highest incentives to self-insure through physical savings,
and the optimal system implements a savings tax that is increasing in ability. Overall,
the optimal system yields high welfare gains.
We have assumed that human capital investments are completely unobservable. While
this is more likely the case for older workers who have completed their formal educa-
tion, human capital investments early in life have some observable components, such as
schooling hours. It would be interesting to explore how incentives to elicit unobserv-
able human capital investments interact with schooling subsidies and other incentives to
elicit observable human capital investments.
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Appendix A A Lagrangean Solution Method
Let λ, φ(a)q(a) and θ(a)q(a) be the Lagrange multipliers on the resource constraint (6),
the first order condition (8) and on the envelope condition (9). The planning problem
can be written as a saddle point of the Lagrangean
max
c,y,e
min
λ,θ,φ
L,
where
L =
∫
A
{(
1+ θ(a)
)
W(a)− θ(a)W(a)
− λ
[
c1(a)− y1(a) + β
∫
H
[c2(a, h2)− y2(a, h2)] p(h2|e1(a)) dh2
]
− θ(a)
∫ a
a
[
V`
(
y1(a˜)
a˜h1
, e1(a˜)
)
y1(a˜)
a˜h1
+ β
∫
H
V`
(
y2(a˜, h2)
a˜h2
, 0
)
y2(a˜, h2)
a˜h2
p(h2|e1(a˜)) dh2
]
da˜
a˜
− φ(a)
[
Ve
(
y1(a)
ah1
, e1(a)
)
− β
∫
H
[
U(c2(a, h2))−V
(
y2(a, h2)
ah2
, 0
)]
pe(h2|e1(a)) dh2
]}
q(a) da
The first-order condition in W(a) implies
∫
A θ(a)q(a) da = 0. Using this, integrating by
parts and rearranging terms, one obtains
L =
∫
A
{(
1+ θ(a)
)
W(a)− λ
[
c1(a)− y1(a) + β
∫
H
[c2(a, h2)− y2(a, h2)] p(h2|e1(a)) dh2
]
−Θ(a)
[
V`
(
y1(a)
ah1
, e1(a)
)
y1(a)
ah1
+ β
∫
H
V`
(
y2(a, h2)
ah2
, 0
)
y2(a, h2)
ah2
p(h2|e1(a)) dh2
]
− φ(a)
[
Ve
(
y1(a)
ah1
, e1(a)
)
+ β
∫
H
[
U(c2(a, h2))−V
(
y2(a, h2)
ah2
, 0
)]
pe(h2|e1(a))
p(h2|e1(a)) p(h2|e1(a)) dh2
]}
q(a) da
where Θ(a) = (aq(a))−1
∫ a
a θ(a˜)q(a˜) da˜ is the cross-sectional cumulative of the Lagrange
multipliers on the envelope condition.
Appendix B Implementation
In this section we decentralize the efficient allocations through a tax system. We describe
the tax system in two steps. In the first one, we follow Werning (2011) to augment the
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direct mechanism and allow the agents to borrow and save, but design the savings tax in
such a way that the agents choose not to do so. In the second step, we design an indirect
tax mechanism that implements the efficient allocation.
Step 1. In the first step, define the tax on savings as follows. Suppose that an a-type
agent reports aˆ. Enlarge the direct mechanism by allowing the agent to borrow and save.
Let s be pre-tax savings, and x(s) be second period after-tax savings satisfying x(0) = 0.
The agent’s budget constraints are
c1 + s ≤ c1(aˆ) (A-1)
c2 ≤ c2(aˆ, h2) + x(s) ∀h2. (A-2)
x(s) can be easily transformed to a more usual tax on interest income τk(s) by x(s) =[
1+ r
(
1− τk(s))] s. Let the lifetime utility from the utility-maximizing report, condi-
tional on savings being s be
Wˆ(s; x|a) = max
aˆ
{
U(c1(aˆ)− s)−V
(
y1(aˆ)
ah1
, e
)
+ β
∫
H
[
U(c2(aˆ, h2) + x(s))−V
(
y2(aˆ, h2)
ah2
, 0
)]
p(h2|e)dh2
}
.
For each ability level a, define now a function x∗(·, a) to be a function x such that the
agent is indifferent among all the savings levels:
Wˆ(s; x∗(·, a)|a) = W(a) ∀s.
Differentiating the function x∗ and evaluating at s = 0, one obtains x∗s (0, a) = 1− δ(a)
and x∗a(0, a) = 0. That is, the derivative with respect to the savings is equal to the inverse
of the savings wedge, and the derivative with respect to one’s type is always zero, when
evaluated at zero savings.14
14The second derivative follows simply from the fact that x∗(0, a) = 0 for all a.
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Step 2. In the second step consider a tax system consisting of income tax functions
T1(y1), T2(y1, y2, h2) and a savings tax X(s, y1) satisfying X(0, y1) = 0. While the first
period income tax depends only on the current income, the second period income tax
depends on the second period human capital realization, and can potentially depend on
the history of incomes. The agent faces the following budget constraints:
c1 + s ≤ y1 − T1(y1) (A-3)
c2 ≤ X(s, y1) + y2 − T2(y1, y2, h2) ∀h2. (A-4)
A consumer with ability a maximizes the expected utility
U(c1)−V
(
y1
ah1
, e
)
+ β
∫
H
[
U(c2(h2))−V
(
y2(h2)
ah2
, 0
)]
p(h2|e)dh2 (A-5)
subject to the budget constraints (A-3) and (A-4). The solution to this market problem for
all abilities is given by (c˜, y˜, s), where (c˜, y˜) is an allocation and s(a) are savings. We
prove the following version of the taxation principle (see Hammond (1979)):
Proposition 6. If an allocation (c, y) satisfies the incentive constraint (5) then there exists a
tax system (T1, T2, X) such that X(0, y) = 0 for all y, and (c, y, 0) solves the market problem.
Conversely, let (T1, T2, X) be a tax system such and (c, y, 0) solves the market problem. Then the
allocation (c, y) is incentive compatible.
Proof. Suppose that an allocation (c, y) satisfies the incentive constraint (5). Define the tax
functions (T1, T2, X) to be such that they satisfy
T1 (y1(a)) = c1(a)− y1(a)
T2 (y1(a), y2(a, h2), h2) = c2(a, h2)− y2(a, h2)
X(s, y1(a)) = x∗(s, a).
For other values in the domain set the taxes T1 and T2 high enough so that no agent chooses such
values. Let
W˜(s, aˆ|a) = U (c1(aˆ)− s)−V
(
y1(aˆ)
ah1
, e
)
+ β
∫
H
[
U (c2(aˆ, h2) + x∗(s))−V
(
y2(aˆ, h2)
ah2
, 0
)]
p(h2|e) dh2.
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Note that Wˆ(s; x∗|a) = maxaˆ W˜(s, aˆ|a). By the definition of x∗,
W(a|a) = W˜(0, a|a) ≥ max
s
W˜(s, aˆ|a) ≥ W˜(0, aˆ|a) = W(aˆ|a) ∀aˆ ∈ A,
Choosing (c, y, 0) yields lifetime utility W(a|a). Any other choice yields W˜(s, aˆ|a) or lower. Hence
(c, y, 0) solves the market problem.
Conversely, take any tax system (T1, T2, M), and let (c, y, s) be the solution to the market
problem. Then a type a agent prefers (c(a), y(a), 0) to (c(aˆ), y(aˆ), 0). The allocation (c, y) is thus
incentive compatible.
Appendix C Validity of the First-Order Approach
Proposition 7 shows the conditions for sufficiency of (8) and Proposition 8 does the same
for (9). In what follows, let P(h|e) = ∫ hh p(h˜|e) dh˜.
Proposition 7. Suppose that e∗(aˆ|a) satisfies (8), and that (i) ∫ hh P(h˜|e) dh˜ is nonincreasing and
convex in e for each h, (ii)
∫
H hp(h|e) dh is nondecreasing concave in e, and (iii) U(c2(aˆ, h))−
V
(
y2(aˆ,h)
ah , 0
)
is nondecreasing and concave in h. Then (4) holds.
The proof is omitted because it follows directly from Jewitt (1988) (Theorem 1). It
shows that under the conditions of the proposition the objective function is strictly con-
cave in e, implying sufficiency of the first-order conditions.
The next proposition shows that if both earnings and learning effort are monotone
in the report, one can recover the global incentive compatibility constraint (5) from the
envelope condition (9):
Proposition 8. Suppose that the allocation satisfies (9). If (i) e∗(aˆ|a), y1(aˆ) and y2(aˆ, h2) are all
nondecreasing in aˆ for each h2, and (ii)
y2(aˆ,h2)
h2
is nondecreasing in h2 for each aˆ, then (5) holds.
Proof. Suppose that an allocation satisfies (9). Assume that aˆ < a. Then (9) implies that (bold
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symbols indicate changes from the previous equation)
W(a)−W(aˆ)
=
∫ a
aˆ
{
V`
(
y1(a˜)
a˜h1
, e∗1(a˜|a˜)
)
y1(a˜)
a˜h1
+ β
∫
H
V`
(
y2(a˜, h2)
a˜h2
, 0
)
y2(a˜, h2)
a˜h2
p(h2|e∗1(a˜|a˜)) dh2
}
da˜
a˜
≥
∫ a
aˆ
{
V`
(
y1(aˆ)
a˜h1
, e∗1(aˆ|a˜)
)
y1(aˆ)
a˜h1
+ β
∫
H
V`
(
y2(aˆ, h2)
a˜h2
, 0
)
y2(aˆ, h2)
a˜h2
p(h2|e∗1(a˜|a˜)) dh2
}
da˜
a˜
≥
∫ a
aˆ
{
V`
(
y1(aˆ)
a˜h1
, e∗1(aˆ|a˜)
)
y1(aˆ)
a˜h1
+ β
∫
H
V`
(
y2(aˆ, h2)
a˜h2
, 0
)
y2(aˆ, h2)
a˜h2
p(h2|e∗1(aˆ|a˜)) dh2
}
da˜
a˜
= W(aˆ, e∗1(aˆ|a)|a)−W(aˆ).
The first equality applies (9). The first inequality follows from the assumption that e∗(aˆ|a), y1(aˆ)
and y2(aˆ, h2) are all increasing in aˆ. The second inequality follows from the fact that
y2(aˆ,h2)
h2
increases in h2 for all aˆ, that the distribution p is such that, for any increasing function f (h),∫
H f (h)p(h|e) dh increases in e, and that e∗(aˆ|a) increases in aˆ again. Finally, the last equality
follows from the fundamental theorem of calculus. The proof is similar for aˆ > a. Therefore,
global incentive compatibility (5) holds.
Taken together, Propositions 7 and 8 give a set of monotonicity conditions that ensure
validity of the first order approach. They can be checked numerically by computing ex-
post the effort plan e∗(aˆ|a) and verifying the monotonicity and concavity requirements,
which we do in Section 4. These conditions are sufficient, but not necessary. If they fail,
one may still be able to verify incentive compatibility by checking directly the conditions
(4) and (5).
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